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The American legal system has generally rejected legal rights for
data privacy and relies instead on market self-regulation and the
litigation process to establish norms of appropriate behavior in
society. Information privacy is protected only through an amalgam of
narrowly targeted rules.' The aggregation of these specific rights
leaves many significant gaps and fewer clear remedies for violations
of fair information practices.2 With an absence of well-established
legal rights, privacy wrongs are currently in search of remedies.
The American public is beginning to demand that data privacy
violators be held accountable. In a recent survey, Internet users
overwhelmingly called for sanctions ranging from jail time to
blacklisting of organizations that failed to respect privacy policies. '
* Joel R. Reidenberg. Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. This
paper was originally prepared for the Nov. 15-16, 2002, symposium, "Enforcing Privacy
Rights," jointly sponsored by the Institute for Law and Economic Policy, the Samuelson
Law, Technology and Public Policy Clinic at Berkeley and the Hastings Law Journal. The
author thanks the symposium participants for their thoughtful comments on the draft and
thanks Tyler Malin for his research assistance. A Fordham Law School faculty research
grant supported work on this article.
1. See, e.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 16811681u (2000); Children's
Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6501 (2000); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 6801-09 (2000); Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510
(2000); Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2000); Telecommunications Act of
1996, 47 U.S.C. § 222 (2000); Cable Communications Policy Act, 47 U.S.C. § 551 (2000).
2. See PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW 379-96
(1996).
3. Opinion Surveys: What Consumers Have To Say About Information Privacy:
Hearing Before Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. (2001) (testimony of Harrison "Lee"
Rainie, Director, Pew Internet & American Life Project) (reporting on a major national
survey of Internet users: "94% of Internet users want privacy violators to be disciplined.
If an Internet company violated its stated privacy policy and used personal information in
ways that it said it would not, 11% of Internet users say the company's owners should be
sent to prison; 27% say the owners should be fined; 26% say the site should be shut down;
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Public enforcement actions and private law suits in the United States
are just emerging as an important force in the creation of adequate
protection for citizens' personal information in American society.
This Article first describes privacy rights and wrongs that frame
the search for remedies in the United States. In particular, this
section focuses on two different types of harm created by the misuse
of personal information and the desire to find protective rights:
personal or private wrongs and public or societal wrongs. Next this
piece explores public enforcement of these privacy wrongs. The
Federal Trade Commission and state Attorneys General have
become important "enforcers" against personal wrongs, but their
efforts fall short of accomplishing systemic change and fail to provide
individual victims with any real remedy. The third part of this Article
examines private claims for privacy wrongs. This section explores
some tortured efforts to obtain redress for privacy violations and
offers a few theories for unexploited and unexplored claims. Finally,
this Article concludes with an instrumentalist view of the search for
remedies. The current mismatch between privacy wrongs and
remedies creates a destabilizing force that will ultimately push in
favor of enhanced legal rights for data privacy.
I. Privacy Rights and Wrongs
Data privacy presents a confused array of rhetoric and principle.
The rhetoric often conflates a wide range of interests and values.
Privacy does not neatly fit a single conceptual model.4 Americans
have asserted that privacy rights protect extremely disparate interests
such as nude sunbathing,' safe sex, electronic communications,' and
spam-free electronic mailboxes.8 Jerry Kang usefully identifies three
groups of asserted privacy rights: spatial, decisional and
informational.9  Spatial rights delineate the individual's physical
sphere of control. Decisional rights relate to an individual's control
30% say the site should be placed on a list of fraudulent Web sites."), available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/107/050820O1Hearing2O9/Rainie3O8.htm.
4. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1090
(2002).
5. United States v. Biocic, 928 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1991) (rejecting a privacy right to
sunbathe in the nude).
6. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
7. Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, 302 F.3d 868 (7th Cir. 2002).
8. Timothy J. Muris, FTC Chairman, Remarks at the Privacy 2001 Conference,
Protecting Consumers' Privacy: 2002 and Beyond (Oct. 4, 2001) ("Consumers' third
concern is with practices that are unwanted intrusions in our daily lives. Unwanted phone
calls disrupt our dinner, and our computers are littered with spam."), at http://www.ftc.
gov/speeches/muris/privispl002.htm.
9. Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1193, 1202-05 (1998).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54
over personal choices. Informational rights define a citizen's role in
the treatment of personal information. Across different types of
articulated privacy interests and values, principles protecting those
interests are enshrined only with great difficulty into American law."
At the same time, a wide range of data privacy wrongs emerge and
underlie the profound sense of unease that Americans report for the
state of privacy in the United States.1' This sense of unease has also
led to changing public expectations. These shifting expectations add
significant uncertainty to claims for corporate liability.
A. Basic Data Privacy Rights
The "right to data privacy" is a fractured and incomplete right in
American law. 2  While the federal constitution provides some
structure to the data practices of the state, the Constitution obviously
never contemplated modern data processing. The Fourth
Amendment and Fifth Amendments impose basic prohibitions on
government data collections by banning illegal searches and seizures
as well as compelled self-incrimination, while the First Amendment
assures significant communications freedoms.'3 However, these rights
do not offer a legal framework for private sector data practices.
The emergence of the concept of standards for fair information
practice originated in the early days of computerization when the U.S.
10. See generally PAUL SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW
(1996).
11. See, e.g., Ben Charny, Protect your Internet Privacy... By Lying, ZDNET NEWS,
Aug. 21, 2000, available at http://zdnet.com.com/2100-11-523232.html?legacy=zdnn
(reporting that up to 25% of Internet users provide false identifying information as a way
to protect their privacy online); Robert O'Harrow Jr., Opinion Split on Web Privacy
Seemingly Contradictory Results Show Lawmakers' Problem, WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 2001,
at E12, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A28560-2001Apr2?
language=printer (reporting that a majority of Americans want law enforcement to have
access to suspects' email, but also want stronger privacy laws); Laura Rohde, Study: U.S.
Surfers Want Guaranteed Privacy, THE INDUSTRY STANDARD, Aug. 21, 2001, available at
http://www.thestandard.com/article/0,1902,17854,00.html (reporting that the majority of
Internet users want guarantees of privacy online); Press Release, Harris Interactive, First
Major Post-9/11 Privacy Survey Finds Consumers Demanding Companies Do More To
Protect Privacy; Public Wants Company Privacy Policies To Be Independently Verified
(Feb. 20, 2002), available at http://www.harrisinteractive.com/news/allnewsbydate.asp?
NewsID=429 (reporting that "most consumers still do not trust companies to handle their
personal information properly."); Business Week/Harris Poll, A Growing Threat, Bus.
WEEK, Mar. 20, 2000, available at http://businessweek.com/2000/00-12/b3673010.htm
(reporting that 82% of Americans are not at all comfortable with the typical data profiling
practice of merging data from different sources).
12. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 2.
13. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling
Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking about You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049
(2000). But see Paul M. Schwartz, Free Speech vs. Information Privacy: Eugene Volokh's
First Amendment Jurisprudence, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1559 (2000).
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Department of Health and Human Services elaborated a code of
practice in 1973 for the fair treatment of citizens' personal
information. 4 In 1980, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development ("OECD") Guidelines succinctly expressed a set of
basic principles as benchmark standards consisting of:
- Collection Limitation Principle
- Data Quality Principle
- Purpose Specification Principle
- Use Limitation Principle
- Security Safeguards Principle
- Openness Principle
- Individual Participation Principle
- Accountability Principle"
These common standards for the fair treatment of personal
information attracted wide acceptance and the principles are
universally recognized for their value as an expression of data privacy
rights. 6
More recently, the US government distilled the basic principles







14. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, SECRETARY'S ADVISORY
COMM. ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS, RECORDS, COMPUTERS AND THE
RIGHTS OF CITIZENS (1973), reprinted in U.S. PRIVACY PROTECTIONS STUDY
COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY 15 n.7 (1977).
15. OECD, RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE COUNCIL CONCERNING GUIDELINES
GOVERNING THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND THE TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF
PERSONAL DATA (Sept. 23, 1980), available at http://www.oecd.org/oecd/pages/
home/displaygeneral/0,3380,EN-document-43-nodirect-orate-no-no-10255-
13,00.html#titlel.
16. The US Department of Commerce has even stated that the OECD Guidelines
form the basis for most privacy codes and US statutes. See U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE,
PRIVACY AND ELECTRONIC COMMERCE § 2 (June 1998) available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20001205195900/http://www.doc.gov/ecommerce/privacy.htm
See also Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy Rules in
Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1325-30 (2000) (showing universal recognition of
these First Principles).
17. See U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, SAFE HARBOR PRIVACY PRINCIPLES (July 21,
2000) available at http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/SHPRINCIPLESFINAL.htm.
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In the United States, the basic principles are only partially
enshrined in legal rights. 8 Statutes such as the Fair Credit Reporting
Act'9 or the Telecommunications Act" address specific elements of
fair information practices, but do not address the full set of concerns
enunciated by the complete set of principles. Tort protections have
not expanded to fill the statutory voids and face significant conceptual
obstacles." Gaps in statutory rights will only be filled, if at all,
through the marketplace and alternative policing.
B. Privacy Harms and Wrongs
The public debate in the United States tends to confuse distinct
types of privacy harms or "wrongs." Breaches of the fair information
practice standards create private wrongs to the individuals about
whom the data relates. In effect, the failure to respect basic standards
forms a per se harm to the individual as an unfair treatment of
personal information. This first category of privacy wrongs might be
termed "personal or private" wrongs.
For data gathering, individuals will perceive intrusive
information practices as wrongful.2 This harm maps to Kang's
concern over spatial privacy. Noxiously intrusive gathering of
personal information or clandestine gathering of data attacks an
individual's physical sphere. Similarly, surveillance of individuals
often evokes the sense of invaded space.
The misuse of personal information is likewise a significant
privacy wrong. When data is collected for one purpose and then
treated differently, the failure to respect the original expectation
constitutes a cognizable harm. Often, however, this privacy harm is
obscured by the polemic that surrounds annoyance and nuisance. To
illustrate, the receipt of junk mail or junk telemarketing calls are
18. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 2.
19. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681u (2000).
20. 47 U.S.C. § 222 (2000).
21. See, e.g., Jay Kesan, Cyber-Working or Cyber-Shirking? A First Principles
Examination of Privacy in the Workplace, 54 FLA. L. REV. 289 (2002); Jeffrey Sovern,
Protecting Privacy with Deceptive Trade Practice Legislation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1305
(2001); Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the U.S.
Private Sector, 80 IOWA L. REV. 497 (1995); Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the
Information Economy, 44 FED. COMM. L. J. 195 (1992).
22. Professor Solove suggests that the typical paradigm for privacy invasions is based
on the Big Brother metaphor and violations from surveillance or intrusiveness and that
the harm caused by surveillance or intrusiveness consists of inhibition, self-censorship,
embarrassment, and damage to one's reputation. He argues that this restrictive view
misses the problems inherent in database treatment of personal information. See Daniel J.
Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy,
53 STAN. L. REV. 1393 (2001).
April 20031 REMEDYING PRIVACY WRONGS
nuisances for most people.23 These are intrusive, though infrequently
at the level of noxiousness. The annoyance is a derivative
consequence of an underlying privacy wrong. The underlying privacy
wrong is the misuse of personal information that gives rise to the
unwanted solicitation. This misuse results from the individual's non-
participatory role in the treatment of personal information. Such a
situation occurs when an individual has no opportunity to object to
the processing of personal information or when participation is
obtained under false pretenses. Additionally, a misuse arises when
data is manipulated in violation of the individual's reasonable
expectations.
Another important type of private wrong arises from outrageous
and noxious data disclosures. Metromail's processing of sensitive
consumer information by incarcerated Texas convicts is a prime
illustration of this point.24 Similarly, Qwest's plan to sell the personal
information of the company's telecommunications customers caused
a public outcry.25
Beyond the personal harms, a second type of privacy wrong
involves "public" or "societal" harm. Scholars argue that data
privacy is a societal value and a requisite element of democracy."Society as a whole has an important stake in the contours of the
23. See, e.g., John Schwartz, Consumers Finding Ways to Zap Telemarketer Calls, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 18, 2002, at CI ("consumers have already signed up by the millions for the
growing number of statewide do-not-call lists").
24. Dennis v. Metromail, No. 96-04451 (Tex. D. Ct. Travis County July 7, 1999)
(notice of pendency hearing on proposed settlement), available at http://www.entwistle-
law.com/news/cases/settled/pdf/newmetronot.pdf.
25. In 2002, Qwest informed customers that the company would sell customers'
information. The plan raised a public outcry that forced the company to abandon the
program. See Press Release, Qwest, Qwest Communication Withdraws Plan to Share
Private Customer Account Information Within Company (Jan. 28, 2002), available at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/cpni/qwest-press release.html. The plan was probably legal
following the Tenth Circuit's absurd decision in U.S. West v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir.
1999), cert. denied sub. nom Competition Policy Inst. v. U.S. West, 120 S. Ct. 2215 (2000).
In that case, the FCC adopted an opt-in standard following an extensive fact-finding
proceeding on the difference between opt-in and opt-out. The federal circuit court,
however, utterly disregarded the administrative record and disingenuously stated that the
FCC had failed to consider various alternatives. Compare U.S. West, 182 F.3d 1224
(holding that the FCC had not considered opt-out alternatives) with In re Implementation
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC Docket Nos. 96-115, 96-149, Second Report
and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rule-Making, FCC 98-27, at §§ 86107 (rel.
Feb. 26, 1998) (extensively discussing and rejecting evidence supporting opt-out).
26. See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV.
1607 (1999); Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the U.S.
Private Sector, 80 IOWA L. REV. 497 (1995); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Participation:
Personal Information and Public Sector Regulation in the United States, 80 IOWA L. REV.
553 (1995); Spiros Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society, 135 U. PA. L.
REV. 707 (1987).
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protection of personal information. 7 Individual autonomy needs
protected zones that defy a purely proprietary, choice model of data
privacy.' 8
The public harm arises from offensive and socially corrosive
practices. For example, Acxiom, one of the largest information-
selling companies in the United States sought to profit from invidious
stereotyping. In its product catalog, the company offered a
"comprehensive ethnicity coding system" for clients to "overlay
Assimilation codes., identifying individuals who may speak their
native language, but do not think in that manner."" The same
company also proposed to clients racial coding that resembled Nazi
Germany's Nuremberg laws.3" The information trafficking abuse of
children is another illustration of offensive and corrosive practices.
One prominent member of the Direct Marketing Association, the
Student Marketing Group, was caught routinely obtaining data from
children under false pretenses in order to sell the information.3 The
company even offered the data categorized by intelligence and
religion."
Additionally, public harm arises from the externalities of
information sharing. Each member of society may have a non-
represented stake in another's disclosures of personal information.
Genetic data demonstrates this problem. The disclosure of one
person's DNA simultaneously reveals information on that person's
family members. Unless the family members can compel
confidentiality, they lose their informational privacy with the
disclosure of the relative's DNA. The effect of data aggregation and
profiling presents the same type of risk, but in a subtler manner. As
data is aggregated in purportedly anonymous fashion and then used
for demographic profiling, the aggregations compromise the ability of
any single member of society to participate in decisions about the
treatment of personal information. To the extent that profiles
27. See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815
(2000).
28. Julie Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1373 (2000).
29. Acxiom Product Catalog, at 5 (1999).
30. Id., (identifying "Jewish" as a race).
31. See Press Release, N.Y. Attorney General, Long Island Firm Sued for Tricking
Students into Providing Private Information (Aug. 29, 2002), available at http://www.oag.
state.ny.us/press/2002/aug/aug29a_02.html.
32. See STUDENT MARKETING GROUP INC., DATABASE & SERVICE, COLLEGE
BOUND HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS, available at http://www.studentmarketing.net/
collbnd.htm (data selects include grade point average, and religious affiliation); STUDENT
MARKETING GROUP INC., DATABASE & SERVICES, available at
http://www.studentmarketing.net/dataserv.htm#ReligiousAffilx (offering to "select...
children by age, gender, and declared religious affiliation").
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become more refined and more predictive, individuals will be
stereotyped for particular behavior and "aggregate" data becomes
associated with individuals. Information redlining becomes the norm.
These inaccurate stereotypes have a socially corrosive power, while
accurate profiles without any participation of the affected individual
begins to resemble clandestine social surveillance.
C. Changing Expectations
Shifting public expectations for privacy pose an important
predicament for organizations that strive to be "good citizens."
Privacy expectations are rising and now include a morally-charged
environment." Transparency of data practices is more prevalent now
than five years ago.34 Yet, transparency is only one element in the set
of basic principles and is insufficient to assure the fair treatment of
personal information. There is a growing public recognition that the
misuse of personal data is harmful. In a rare public referendum on
privacy, North Dakota citizens repealed the legislature's weakening
of the state privacy law and restored opt-in privacy for financial
information by a vote of 72% to 28% .3
For companies trying to do the "right thing," the guideposts are
moving. Consensus on accountability for privacy remains elusive in
the United States. At the same time, companies trying to respect
privacy interests and values find themselves enmeshed in a turbulent
legal environment. The structure for the treatment of personal
information is increasingly defined through scandals and enforcement
actions rather than sensible fair information practices.
33. See Steven Hetcher, Norm Proselytizers Create a Privacy Entitlement in
Cyberspace, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 877 (2001).
34. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 6803 (requiring notice by financial institutions of sharing of
personal information); U.S. Dep't Health & Hum. Servs. Notice of Privacy Practices for
Protected Health Information, 45 C.F.R. § 164.520 (2000) (requiring notice of use of
personal information in health care); FTC, A REPORT FROM THE FTC STAFF:
PROTECTING CONSUMERS ONLINE THE FTC's FIRST FIVE YEARS 20 (Dec. 1999),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9912/fiveyearreport.pdf (reporting that only a small
percentage of web sites posted privacy notices in 1998, but that the percentage had risen
substantially by 1999). See also HARRIS INTERACTIVE, CONSUMER PRIVACY ATTITUDES
AND BEHAVIORS SURVEY WAVE II AT 4, July 11, 2001, available at
http://www.bbbonline.org/UnderstandingPrivacy/library/harris2-execsum.pdf (reporting
that 82% of Internet users had seen privacy notices in April 2001); Georgetown Internet
Privacy Policy Survey, Report to the FTC (June 8, 1999), available at
http://www.msb.edu/faculty/culnanm/GIPPS/gippsl.pdf, at 6 (reporting that 34% of web
sites posted no privacy notices at all).
35. See S. Bill 2191, 2001 Leg. Assem, (N.D. 2001), available at
http://www.state.nd.us/sec/pdf/referredmeasureno2ballotlang2002.pdf; Bank Privacy
Measure Fails, Grandforks.com (June 12, 2001) (North Dakota voters "threw out a new
state law that.., made it easier for banks to sell their customers' checkbook secrets.")
available at http://www.grandforks.com/mld/grandforks/3450535.htm.
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II. Public Enforcement of Privacy Wrongs
Media attention to privacy scandals and concern among the
public for privacy wrongs motivate state actors to seek remedies. As
a normative proposition, public enforcement ought to devote its
resources toward systemic corrections in industry practices that would
stop or prevent public wrongs. Such an emphasis would promote
remedies that are socially constructive and "democracy enhancing."
However, in the absence of statutory data privacy rights, public
enforcement is adrift. The lack of clear statutory authority for
information privacy actions results in strained efforts to find a
remedy. Indeed, public enforcement depends on creative and often
convoluted theories of liability. These tertiary theories tend to
mismatch public enforcement with personal wrongs rather than match
them with public wrongs. At the same time, public enforcement
relies on actors of expedience rather than enforcement agencies with
specific privacy mandates. On the national level, a somewhat unlikely
agency, the Federal Trade Commission, reluctantly took the federal
lead and pursues enforcement actions through legal mechanisms that
were not designed for privacy claims. 6 The states Attorneys General,
though, are more disenchanted by the deficit in privacy rights and are
more aggressive in their search for privacy remedies.
A. Tertiary Claims
The lack of fundamental statutory protection forces government
actors to find tertiary rights for the assertion of privacy claims. This
instrumental constraint limits public enforcement of personal wrongs
where specific harms occur and inhibits state actors from addressing
the public wrongs where more general harms occur. Most notably,
state agencies resort to trade practice legislation as a means of
policing voluntary disclosures of information-handling practices by
companies. The most aggressive public enforcement focuses on data
collection vices rather than the reform of profiling and information
redlining practices.37
Beginning in 1996, the staff of the Federal Trade Commission
recognized that some privacy wrongs might be addressed through
existing statutory authority relying on the FTC's "unfair and
36. For an interesting discussion of the FFC's jurisdictional interest, see Steven J.
Hetcher, The FTC as a Privacy Norm Entrepreneur, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2041 (2000).
37. See Edward C. Baig et al., Privacy: The Internet Wants Your Personal Info. What's
In It For You?, BUSINESS WEEK ONLINE, April 5, 1999 available at http://www.
businessweek.com/1999/99_14/b3623028.htm ("Some companies use the gold mine of
consumer data to discriminate against customers who don't make the grade.").
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deceptive trade practice"38 jurisdiction. Two years later, the FTC
brought its first case under this theory against GeoCities. The
theory maintains that companies commit an "unfair" or "deceptive"
practice when they inaccurately describe their information handling
practices. More recently, state Attorneys General have brought
enforcement actions based on the state analogs of the federal statute.
This approach targets the data collection process and its transparency.
Since few companies have any obligation to disclose their privacy
policies, this public enforcement only improves the accuracy of any
transparency. 40 In an ironic twist, this public enforcement also
provides a disincentive for greater transparency. A company risks
liability by making a disclosure, but does not risk accountability by
remaining silent. Alternatively, a company's policy may be drafted to
avoid any meaningful disclosures and any privacy commitments at all.
Indeed, for real transparency, an access right is necessary. Yet, the
trade practice theory does not create an affirmative obligation to
grant an individual access to personal information held and processed
by an organization.
To a very limited extent, the objectives of prosecution for
deception, do advance a systemic goal through a societal effect.
While the results of any enforcement predicated on "unfair and
deceptive practices" relate only to specific companies, the public
efforts generally seek to raise corporate awareness and change
industry behavior. At best, the trade practice theory advances the
accuracy of statements about privacy practices, but does not obtain a
remedy for any individual victim. The goal of the public proceeding
is the cessation of a specific company's wrongful information practice.
The narrowness of this approach is also evident, since its objectives
do not include the prevention of information misuse itself. In effect,
the theory is a weak proxy for the wrongs associated with misuse of
personal data.
The other main effort at public enforcement looks to data
security as a proxy for wrongful disclosures of personal information. 41
38. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2000); See also FTC STAFF REPORT, PUBLIC WORKSHOP
ON CONSUMER PRIVACY ON THE GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 29 (Dec.
1996), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy/privacy.pdf.
39. In 1998, the FTC reached a settlement with Geocities after complaining that
Geocities obtained personal information through misrepresentations. See In re GeoCities,
FTC Docket No. 98-23051 (Aug. 13 1998) (agreement containing consent order) available
at http:l/www.ftc.gov/os/1998/980/index.htm#13.
40. Financial service companies are the unusual exception. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act requires financial service providers to disclose their information privacy policies. 15
U.S.C. § 6803 (2000).
41. See, e.g., Press Release, N.Y. Attorney General, Spitzer Reaches Internet Privacy
Agreement with Alta Vista (Aug. 21, 2001), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/
press/2001/aug/aug2la_01.html; Press Release, N.Y. Attorney General, Major
[Vol. 54HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
REMEDYING PRIVACY WRONGS
In the Eli Lily case, for example, the pharmaceutical company sent an
email to patients who received information from the company on a
drug to treat their psychiatric problem. The message revealed the
addresses of all the patients as a result of improper use of the email
software. Instead of attacking the wrongful disclosure itself-the real
harm-the public enforcement action addressed the violation of the
company's promise to treat patients' personal information with
adequate security measures."
In effect, the necessity for state actors to rely on creative, tertiary
theories for privacy claims means that state enforcement does not
address the public wrongs. The tertiary claims miss the underlying
public issues of potentially corrosive practices such as profiling and
stereotyping individuals. For example, the New York Attorney
General's case against Student Market Group attacks the company's
data gathering practices as wrongful methods in obtaining data from
children.43 The real privacy issue and public wrong, however, is the
offensive trafficking in children's data. But, this wrong could not be
the core of the public enforcement action when the basis for state
enforcement was a tertiary theory of unfair trade practice.
B. Expedient Actors
Public enforcement of data privacy relies on an expedient set of
actors who are generally mismatched to remedy public wrongs. The
public actors do not have specific statutory privacy rights authority.
Instead, they exploit derivative powers to play a role in privacy
claims. At the federal level, the current enforcement agency is the
Federal Trade Commission." In many ways, this agency is an illogical
Pharmaceutical Company Agrees to New Safeguards for Consumer Data (July 25, 2002),
available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/jul/jul25c_02.html; N.Y. Press Release,
Attorney General, Major Tech Publisher Reaches Agreement with Attorney General on
E-commerce Security Standards (Aug. 28, 2002), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.
us/press/2002/aug/aug28a_ 02.html.
42. Press Release, N.Y. Attorney General, Major Pharmaceutical Company Agrees to
New Safeguards for Consumer Data (July 25, 2002), available at http://www.oag.state.
ny.us/press/2002/jul/ju125c 02.html.
43. See Press Release, N.Y. Attorney General, Long Island Firm Sued for Tricking
Students into Providing Private Information (Aug. 29, 2002), available at http://www.oag.
state.ny.us/press/2002/aug/aug29a_.02.html.
44. The FCC never really thought about information privacy (other than wiretapping)
until the Telecommunications Act of 1996 added a provision protecting the privacy of
"customer proprietary network information." Under the Telecommunications Act, the
FCC engaged in a rulemaking to determine the requisite degree of subscriber participation
in service providers' decisions to market call information. See U.S. West Inc. v. FCC, 182
F.3d 1224, 1229 (10th Cir. 1999) cert. denied sub nom., Competition Policy Institute v. U.S.
West Inc., 120 S. Ct. 2215 (2000).
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choice for the protection of citizens' privacy. The FTC's mission is to
enforce antitrust and certain consumer protection laws:
The Commission seeks to ensure that the nation's markets function
competitively, and are vigorous, efficient, and free of undue
restrictions. The Commission also works to enhance the smooth
operation of the marketplace by eliminating acts or practices that
are unfair or deceptive."
Reliance on the FTC as a primary enforcer of citizen privacy is
misplaced. The prevention of privacy wrongs, and particularly the
public wrongs, as such, is simply not part of the core mission of the
FTC. The FTC is not charged with the enforcement of civil rights,
nor is the agency equipped or permitted to handle employment or
telecommunications privacy matters. In fact, the FTC only grudgingly
accepted involvement with privacy issues. During the mid-1990s,
Commissioner Christine Varney persistently raised privacy as an
important issue. For many years, the FTC hoped that the market
would self-regulate and did not want to intervene aggressively. The
FTC even opposed new federal legislation to protect information
privacy. 6
The FTC has historically admitted that its unfairness jurisdiction
is "evolutionary. 4 7  Indeed, in the past, the FTC has stated to
Congress that consumer unfairness requires substantial injury and
that "emotional impact and other more subjective types of harm ...
will not ordinarily make a practice unfair.",41 Since all of the FTC's
deceptive practices cases have settled prior to any court decision, the
legal standards remain uncertain. The scope of the FTC's
"unfairness" jurisdiction remains ripe for a court decision.49 More
importantly, changes in the composition of the FTC can result in
significant policy changes with respect to enforcement. Whether the
FTC will even retain a serious interest in privacy enforcement
remains to be seen.
While the FTC seems to be the federal regulator of choice for a
light touch in enforcement against privacy wrongs, the states'
Attorneys General have taken a more aggressive stance. The
National Association of Attorneys General has an Internet Law task
force that studies and coordinates the enforcement of privacy.0 In
45. FTC, VISION, MISSION, & GOALS, at http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/mission.htm.
46. FTC, SELF-REGULATION AND PRIVACY ONLINE: REPORT TO CONGRESS (1999),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9907/privacy99.pdf (urging Congress not to legislate
privacy rights for online activities, but to wait for self-regulation).
47. See Letter from FTC to Senate Consumer Subcomm. of the Comm. on Commerce,
Science and Transp., (Dec. 17, 1980), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-
unfair.htm.
48. See id.
49. See FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239-45 (1972).
50. See Nat'l Ass'n. of Attys. Gen., at http://www.naag.org (last visited Jan. 16, 2003).
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effect, the states are unwilling to wait for federal results. This more
aggressive stance of public enforcement at the state level is illustrated
well by an enforcement action brought against DoubleClick. In
February 2000, the Electronic Privacy Information Center ("EPIC"),
a prominent privacy advocacy group, filed a complaint against
DoubleClick with the Federal Trade Commission based on the
company's practice of profiling web users without adequate
disclosure.' EPIC's complaint focused on the lack of disclosure and
on profiling as an "unfair and deceptive practice." The FTC
eventually closed its investigation with no action. 2 However, a
coalition of ten states pursued DoubleClick's practices and compelled
DoubleClick to accept a binding agreement regarding privacy policies
and disclosure; DoubleClick also accepted a fine of $450,000 to
reimburse the states' investigative 
costs. 
Like the federal actions, the state cases that rely on "unfair and
deceptive practices" statutory authority do not address the public
wrongs directly. When states pursue claims, the results are only able
to achieve company specific cessations of particular data processing
practices.54 These remedies address specific harms to individuals
rather than the broader harms caused by wide-spread practices. The
absence of claims against companies that engaged in egregious
profiling and stereotyping, like Acxiom, illustrates that addressing
directly the public wrongs falls generally outside the scope of a state
Attorney General's statutory authority.
51. See EPIC Files FTC Complaint Against DoubleClick Alleging "Deceptive and
Unfair Trade Practices" in Online Data Collection (Feb. 10, 2002) copy of the complaint
available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/internet/ftc/DCLK-Complaint.pdf.
52. See Letter from Joel Winston, Acting Associate Director, Division of Financial
Practices, Federal Trade Commission, to Christine Varney, counsel for DoubleClick (Jan.
22, 2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/closings/staff/doubleclick.pdf.
53. See In the Matter of DoubleClick: Agreement between the Attorneys General of
the States of Arizona, California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, Vermont, and Washington and DoubleClick (Aug. 26, 2002) available
at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/aug/aug26a_02-attach.pdf; Press Release, N.Y.
State Att'y Gen., Major Online Advertiser Agrees to Privacy Standards for Online
Tracking (Aug. 26, 2002), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/aug/aug26
a_02.html.
54. See, e.g., Press Release, N.Y. State Att'y Gen., Spitzer Reaches Internet Privacy
Agreement with Alta Vista (Aug. 21, 2001), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/
2001/aug/aug2la_01.html; Press Release, N.Y. State Att'y Gen., Major Pharmaceutical
Company Agrees to New Safeguards for Consumer Data (July 25, 2002), available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/july/july25c_02.html; Press Release, N.Y. State Att'y
Gen., Major Tech Publisher Reaches Agreement with Attorney General on E-commerce
Security Standards (Aug. 28, 2002), available at http://www.oag.state.
ny.us/press/2002/aug/aug28a_02.html; Press Release, Minn. Att'y Gen., Minnesota
Attorney General and U.S. Bancorp Settle Customer Privacy Suit, (July 1999) available at
http://www.ag.state.mn.us/consumer/Privacy/PR/pr-usbank_07011999.html.
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III. Private Claims for Privacy Wrongs
The main goal of private claims for privacy wrongs should be the
vindication of a personal harm. The key objective for citizens, when
faced with abusive information practices, is redress. In this context,
the use of private claims as a policy mechanism to achieve systemic
change would not be congruent with the goal of individual redress.
Redressing personal wrongs, however, presents troubling obstacles.
As a threshold matter, the identification of an enforceable legal right
to privacy poses an important challenge. Recent attempts to fit data
privacy within existing rights have met strong court resistance. Other
unexploited claims and creative new theories offer attractive
instruments for redress. However, these possibilities also face
significant practical challenges.
A. The Threshold Obstacle: Finding a Right
Victims of the abuse of personal information have a difficult time
identifying a legal right that would afford a remedy for data privacy
violations. In general, American law does not require the disclosure
of data practices.5 However, the creative use of consumer protection
statutes serves to police the accuracy of any privacy policy disclosures
made by organizations. However, the federal statute lacks any
private right of action.56 State statutes may offer private rights of
action though these are likely to impose particular injury
requirements that are hard to meet7 or other restrictions on the use
of the statutory right.
58
Privacy wrongs related to offensive data collection practices
similarly face a void in remedial options. Without a direct statutory
right to the fair treatment of personal information, Internet privacy
victims unsuccessfully argued recently that the surreptitious gathering
by DoubleClick of information about web users' surfing was an illegal
interception of communications between the user and the web site. 9
The federal district court, in an opinion worthy of Charles Dickens'
55. Several laws in particular circumstances do require some disclosures. See, e.g.,
12 U.S.C. § 6903 (financial institutions must provide notice of data practices), 12 U.S.C.
§ 1681 (b)(C)(1)(B) (consumer reporting agencies must provide notice of an opt-out right
for certain types of unsolicited marketing offers).
56. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2000) (creating public enforcement without any
private remedies).
57. See, e.g., Smith v. Chase Manhattan Bank, USA, 741 N.Y.S.2d 100 (N.Y. App. Div.
2d. Dept. 2002).
58. See Goshen v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of N.Y., 744 N.E.2d 1190 (N.Y. 2002)
(private parties limited in ability to bring suit); Oswego Laborer's Local 214 Pension Fund
v. Marine Midland Bank, 647 N.E.2d 741 (N.Y. 1995) (for a private action, deception is
measured against the reasonable person.).
59. In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litigation, 154 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y., 2001).
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"circumlocution office,"' rejected a consolidated class action claim.6'
The court held that the participating web sites could, under the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act,62 consent to the gathering of
personal information from their users without their users knowledge
or consent. 63  Courts have also rejected the argument that
DoubleClick acted tortiously, thereby invalidating the consent.64
Similarly, attempts to treat data collection wrongs as a form of
trespass in the online environment do not work. Secret gathering of
personal information might be an offense under the provisions of the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act that address stored wire and
electronic communications records. 65 These sections were designed to
sanction computer hackers. However, according to at least one court,
these protections do not extend to personal computers, but rather are
reserved for the protection of Internet access services through ISPs or
other servers.66 Victims are grappling to fit wrongful data collections
into the existing legal protections against wiretapping.67 Victims are
also trying to fit offensive, secret data collection practices into the
prescriptions of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.66 The law
creates protection against any person who intentionally accesses
computers without authorization and against any computer user who
exceeds authorization.69 The statute requires "losses aggregating at
least $5000" and the courts seem to be split on whether to require a
showing of economic loss from a single act over the course of a one-
year time period.7"
In at least one other prominent case, the search to find a remedy
against a wrongful disclosure of personal information fell flat. An
educational institution illegally released a college student's
disciplinary record. Despite the illegality of the release of the record
60. CHARLES DICKENS, LITrLE DORRIT, 104 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1992), available
at http://www.freebooks.biz/Classics/Dickens/Little/LittelO_1l.htm.
61. DoubleClick Inc., 154 F. Supp. 2d at 526-27.
62. 18 U.S.C. § 2510-11 (2000).
63. DoubleClick Inc., 154 F. Supp. 2d at 510-11.
64. Id. at 514-19. In a separate case, another federal district court came to the same
conclusion. Chance v. Avenue A, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1163 (W.D. Wash. 2001). See
also In re Pharmatrack Inc. Privacy Litig., 220 F. Supp. 2d 4, 12 (MA, 2002) [hereinafter In
re Pharmatrack Litigation]
65. 18 U.S.C. § 2510-11 (2000).
66. In re Pharmatrack Litigation, supra note 64, at 13.
67. See, e.g., In re Toys-R-Us Privacy Litigation, No. 00-1381 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16947 * 3-6 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
68. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) (2000).
69. Id. § 1030(a)(2).
70. See EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 584-85 (1st Cir. 2001);
In re Pharmatrak Litigation, supra note 64 at 15. But see In re Toys R Us, Inc., 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 16947 at *32; In re America Online Inc. Version 5.0 Software Litigation, 168
F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1382 (S.D. Fl. 2001).
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under the Federal Education Right to Privacy Act ("FERPA"), the
statute provided no direct remedy and the victim sought
unsuccessfully to graft a remedy on FERPA through the civil rights
law.7
In all, these claims show that privacy remedies for personal
wrongs are not easily accommodated within the existing set of legal
rights. Even worse, these possibilities do not provide a basis for many
basic elements of fair information practice such as a data subject
access right, the right to have obsolete data purged, and the right to
fairness in the collection of personal information.
B. Under-Exploited Options and Theories
Although the efforts to find remedies for personal wrongs under
existing statutory rights leave many gaps, a number of under-
exploited options and theories may nevertheless emerge. The Fair
Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"), 2 for example, may serve as a
stronger protection against profiling and general data misuse. The
FCRA seeks primarily to assure the integrity of consumer
information used to evaluate an individual's creditworthiness, fitness
for employment, and eligibility for insurance." Credit report
information is now a very attractive source of data for marketing
efforts since credit reporting agencies maintain some of the most
current, reliable information available on individuals' financial status.
Increasingly, credit report information is sought for general
marketing purposes rather than the original purpose of credit
decision-making. The FCRA prohibits obtaining and using credit
report information without a permissible purpose." The statute only
allows the release of credit report information for marketing purposes
"if the transaction consists of a firm offer of credit or insurance."
75
Companies such as Worldcom and AT&T Wireless have tried to skirt
the FCRA's prohibition on the disclosure of credit report information
for unsolicited advertising. Both of these companies have been
rummaging through consumer credit reports to drum up business for
wireless phone service and for the sale of wireless telephones.76 At
71. Gonzaga University v. Doe, 122 S. Ct. 2268, 2276 (2002) (denying a remedy under
42 U.S.C. § 1983).
72. 15 U.S.C. § 1681-1681v (2000).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a (2000).
74. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(f) (2000)
75. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(c)(1)(B)(i) (2000).
76. See Solicitation from Worldcom, May 2002 ("You have been pre-approved for
WorldCom Wireless service"); Free Phone Voucher from Worldcom, May 2002 ("This
Pre-approved Voucher entitles you to a FREE Motorola digital wireless phone");
Solicitation from AT&T Wireless, Feb. 2002 ("You are Pre-Approved for a FREE
wireless phone when you activate new service with AT&T Wireless").
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least one credit reporting agency, Equifax, is a willing accomplice.77
Other companies, like USSearch.com or ChoicePoint, engage in
precisely the type of profiling that the FCRA targets." Yet, these
companies reject the obligations of the FCRA.79 The potential claims
against credit reporting agencies for illegally disclosing credit
information and failing to comply with the FCRA, as well as the
claims against their clients-the companies that illegally obtained the
data-are significant.
A promising, though largely untested, theory for private
remedies is the common law tort of misappropriation of name or
likeness." This tort essentially protects the commercial value of an
individual's identity from conversion. The classic cases involve the
use of a celebrity's name without permission to endorse a product.
The value of the celebrity's name is used to market the product. This
is very similar to the collection of data for profiling and sale. When
individuals are profiled, the characteristics of the profile take on a
commercial value. The value of any particular profile or name in a
database may be small, but in the aggregate the profiles have a
77. The FCRA requires companies sending unsolicited offers of credit or insurance to
disclose how and where the consumer's name was acquired. Ironically, AT&T Wireless
and Worldcom respected this provision. See Solicitation from Worldcom, May 2002
("information contained in your credit report maintained by Equifax... was used in
connection with this offer"); Solicitation from AT&T Wireless, Feb. 2002 ("we used
information we obtained from a consumer-reporting agency... Equifax").
78. See, e.g., http://www.ussearch.com (offering "comprehensive" searches including
bankruptcies, civil judgments, real estate values and other data that may be included in
credit scoring algorithms); Choicepoint Marketview, at http://www.choicepoint.coml
industry/financial/direct_2.html (the Marketview direct marketing "database includes data
on demographics, lifestyle, credit bureau information, and proprietary insurance and
financial attributes").
79. ChoicePoint, for example, advertises its database as a general marketing database,
but nevertheless offers profiles based on credit factors such as home loans and car loans.
Compare http://www.choicepointprecisionmarketing.com/data-marketview.html with
ChoicePoint Marketing Prospect Lists Personal Lines P & C, http://www.
choicepointprecisionmarketing.com/download/cppm-dds-plines.pdf.
USSearch.com disingenuously tries to avoid the application of the FCRA with a
disclaimer contained in the Terms and Conditions of the Consumer Services User
Agreement. The disclaimer is hard to find and purchasers of services from USSearch.com
are not required to make any affirmation that would negate illegitimate uses of personal
information prior to acquiring data from USSearch.com. See http://www.ussearch.com
(follow link to purchase "background searches" to a page where "Enhanced Exhaustive
Background with Criminal" searches can be purchased. On the side of this page, there is a
fine print link to the "Consumer Services User Agreement."). For the text of the service
agreement, see US SEARCH.com Inc., Consumer Services User Agreement Terms and
Conditions (Oct. 2002), at http://www.1800ussearch.com/user-agreement.html.
80. See William Prosser, The Right to Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 401 (1960). Some
states, like New York, have codified the common law tort of misappropriation of a name
or likeness. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1992).
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commercial worth.' The sale of the profile captures the value of
those characteristics of the individual just as a product endorsement
captures the value of a celebrity's name. Whether the value is large
or small, the tort does not distinguish between the conversions of the
name's value.
In the context of data privacy, only four states have faced this
claim: Ohio," Illinois," New Hampshire84 and Virginia. Three of
these cases (Ohio, Illinois and Virginia) involved challenges to the
sale of mailing lists containing the names and addresses of clients,
while the fourth (New Hampshire) addressed the sale of personal
information by an information service. In Ohio, the state appellate
court confused the claim of misappropriation with the annoyance of
receiving junk mail.86 In Illinois, the state appellate court found that
the name on a list did not have intrinsic economic value.87 The value
was only in the associations and profiling created by the gatherer of
the personal information.88 This reasoning does not make any sense.
The characteristics associated with the name are precisely the types of
value for which the tort assigns control to the individual. Indeed, at
least one court has recognized the misappropriation of an individual's
information profile to meet the damages threshold in the context of
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.8 In Virginia, the state county
court found that a deliberately misspelled name does not give rise to a
claim for misappropriation.' No state supreme court has issued a
ruling on the merits of any of these three mailing list cases.
81. For example, a list of names with particular demographic characteristics may be
sold for less than $0.15 per name. In March 2003, American List Counsel charged $0.08
per name for new movers profiled by ethnicity and $0.12 per name for "the new
generation of moneyed Moms and Dads." See American List Counsel, Data Card: New
Mover Profiler-New Homeowners ALC, available at http://search.alcdata.com/
market?page=research/datacard&id=56967 (listing a base fee of $71/thousand names and
a supplemental charge of $10/thousand names for an ethnicity selection); American List
Counsel, Data Card: Forbes-Successful Young Families with Children, available at
http://search.alcdata.com/market?page=research/datacard&id=56572 (listing a base fee of
$125/thousand names). Other data, such as a credit report, may be more expensive and
cost as much as $25 per name. See Accurate Business Credit, ABC Resources , available
at http://www.abccreditreports.com/pricing.html (listing the fee to purchase a single
consumer credit report as $25).
82. Shibley v. Time, Inc., 341 N.E.2d 337, 337-38 (Ohio App. Ct. 1975).
83. Dwyer v. American Express Co., 652 N.E. 2d 1351, 1356 (I11. App. Ct. 1995).
84. Estate of Boyer v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001 (N.H. 2003).
85. Avrahami v. U.S. News & World Report Inc., No. 95-1318, 1996 Va. Cir. LEXIS
518, at *1 (1996).
86. Shibley, 341 N.E.2d at 339.
87. Dwyer, 652 N.E.2d at 1356.
88. Id.
89. In re Toys R US, Inc. Privacy Litigation, No. 00-1381, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16947, at *36 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
90. Avrahami, 1996 Va. Cir. LEXIS 518 *'1718.
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The misappropriation tort did, however, reach the New
Hampshire Supreme Court in the context of data privacy. There, in
Estate of Amy Lynn Boyer v. Docusearch, Inc., an online
information service provided a young woman's birth date, home
address, social security number, and employment address to her
stalker. Using the information, the stalker killed the woman at her
place of employment." The victim's estate brought several claims for
invasion of privacy against the online information service, including
misappropriation of the victim's name for commercial benefit. New
Hampshire had never before considered the tort of misappropriation
of a name or likeness.93 The state supreme court recognized the tort,
but refused to consider the sale by the investigator as a
misappropriation. The court said:
An investigator who sells personal information sells the
information for the value of the information itself, not to take
advantage of the person's reputation or prestige .... [T]he benefit
derived from the sale in no way relates to the social or commercial
standing of the person whose information is sold.94
Although the Court's factual assertion about the value to the
investigator of the information is suspect,9 the reasoning opens the
door widely for claims against information brokers who sell consumer
profiles. The benefit from the sale of profile information explicitly
appropriates value from the social and commercial standing of the
individuals who are profiled.
The misappropriation claim, thus, appears ripe for state courts
around the country. In particular, the California courts would be a
promising venue to establish this remedy, since the protection against
misappropriation exists in California96 and more significantly, the
legal climate is hospitable. California is one of the few states to have
a constitutional provision on privacy and is unique in the application
of that provision to the private sector.97 When California added the
privacy clause to the state constitution, the trafficking in personal
information and the establishment of rights against private conduct
were specifically contemplated and part of the successful ballot
initiative. Indeed, the scope and remedies of the Constitutional
91. Estate of Boyer v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001 (N.H. 2003).
92. Id. at 1006.
93. Id. at 1009.
94. Id. at 1010.
95. If the personal information has a commercial value, then the value may in fact
derive from attributes of the individual's identity such as where the person lives or works.
96. CAL. CiV. CODE § 3344 (West 1997) (codification of the misappropriation tort).
97. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1. See also Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633, 641 (Cal. 1994)
(applying the constitutional protections to private conduct).
98. See J. Clark Kelso, California's Constitutional Right to Privacy, 19 PEPP. L. REV.
327, 418 (1992).
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provision are largely unexplored for private enforcement against
private conduct.
While various new theories and unexploited claims may be
asserted in private enforcement actions, an important incongruence
will exist for these claims. The FCRA, misappropriation and
California constitutional claims are collective action claims.
Generally, tens of thousands of individuals will be identically situated,
if not millions, in the case of many typical data processing activities.
The underlying harm becomes a public wrong against society as a
whole for the profiling and large-scale manipulative practices and not
just a personal wrong for the misuse of an individual's data. Private
enforcement actions would then be seeking to correct public wrongs
rather than focusing on individual redress of personal wrongs.
C. Defining the Damage
Beyond the search for an appropriate right, another significant
threshold issue is the definition of damage. The misuse of personal
information is both a personal wrong to individuals and a public
wrong to society. Harm comes through the transgression of fair
information practices and does not depend on additional
consequences from the wrong. Some argue, however, that privacy
redress should only occur if there is a monetary harm.99 In a startling
decision under the Cable Communications Policy Act, a federal court
ruled that a clear violation of the statutory protection for data privacy
caused no harm and refused to grant relief to a private party."
Under this "monetary" harm approach, wrongful disclosure is not
considered "actual" harm. This approach either misses the point of
data privacy or is a disingenuous answer to the privacy wrongs. The
very breach of a recognized fair information practice standard
inherently wrongs the individual. Such "unfair" information practices
are autonomous wrongful acts that do not depend on financial
consequences for their harm. The wrongful disclosure in and of itself
is an "actual harm" to the individual. More broadly, the corrosive
effect of information trafficking on society does not depend on the
monetary damages potentially caused to particular victims.
99. See, e.g., Hearing on the Need for Internet Privacy Legislation Before the Senate
Comm. on Science and Technology, 107th Sess. 1 (July 11, 2001) (statement of Fred H.
Cate, Professor, Ind. Univ. Sch. of Law Bloomington) available at http://www.
senate.gov/-commerce/hearings/071101Cate.PDF; Solveig Singleton, Privacy as
Censorship, Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 295 (Jan. 22, 1998) available at http://www.
cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-295.pdf.
100. See Parker v. Time Warner Entertainment Co., 198 F.R.D. 374, 381 (E.D.N.Y.
2001) (finding no actual harm under the Cable Communications Policy Act, 47 U.S.C.
§ 557(a)(1), for wrongful disclosures absent a showing of monetary harm).
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D. Cost Disincentives
Significantly, the cost of suit generally serves as a major
disincentive for individuals to bring claims that would vindicate
privacy wrongs. Because privacy violations often occur on a large
scale, the damages may be construed as disproportionate to the harm,
particularly when harm is measured by the monetary consequences
that flow from the privacy wrong. One recent case illustrates this
difficulty. Trans Union over a period of years, committed significant
violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act and was challenged by the
Federal Trade Commission. After almost a decade of appeals by
Trans Union, the Federal Trade Commission prevailed when the D.C.
Circuit affirmed that Trans Union illegally sold personal information
for marketing purposes. 1' The Supreme Court, with an unusual
dissent, denied a writ of certiorari.1 2 When the actual victims sought
to recover damages under the FCRA's mandatory provision granting
minimum statutory damages, the federal district court in Illinois
denied class certification because of the potentially crushing blow to
the privacy violating company.' In effect, the court denied the
victims a remedy. Although the FCRA does include a provision on
attorney's fees, the minimum statutory damages of $100, without a
class action is insufficient to justify litigation over a wrongful act
having an incremental impact such as an occasional illegal disclosure
of credit information rather than a spectacular consequence such as
the denial of a mortgage based on inaccurate information.
Conclusion: The Public Effect of
Enforcement for Private Wrongs
The prospects for public and private enforcement of privacy
wrongs are at present unsatisfying. On the surface, the current efforts
show confused and mismatched objectives between public and private
enforcement. In essence, normative goals have been reversed: public
enforcement seeks to remedy personal wrons, ' while private
enforcement seeks to prevent wide-scale harms. 05 The absence of
clear statutory data privacy rights constrains public enforcement to
101. Trans Union Corp. v. FTC, 245 F.3d 809, 811 (D.C. Cir., 2001). The author served
as an expert adviser and witness in this case for the Federal Trade Commission.
102. Trans Union v. FTC, 122 S. Ct. 2386, 2386-87 (2002).
103. In re Trans Union Corp. Privacy Litig., 211 F.R.D. 328, 351 (N.D. I11. 2002) (class
certification denied for sale of personal information in violation of FCRA). A similar
problem arose under the Truth-in-Lending Act. See Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust
Co., 54 F.R.D. 412, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (no class certification when the calculated
damages were disproportional to the monetary harm suffered by the victims).
104. See Part II.A.
105. See Part III.B.
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pursue personal wrongs. These public claims for private harms are
not an effective means to achieve personal redress for each victim.
Indeed, a variety of misuses of personal information such as the
failure to provide access or numerous types of surveillance activities
fall outside the scope of any statutory authority for public
enforcement. Conversely, many of the private claims against data
collection practices try to address much broader public wrongs
associated with stereotyping and information redlining. Yet, these
private claims can only have an indirect effect on public harms.
Private claims bring adverse publicity to industry practices that, in
turn, may provoke salutary industry-wide changes such as the
increased number of privacy policies posted on web sites. Such
improvements, however, are only secondary effects of the publicity
and still fall short of providing any effective remedy to individuals for
violations of fair information practice standards.
The reversal of goals is an unfortunate consequence of the
difficulty of finding a legal right to enforce. The real search behind
the efforts to remedy privacy violations is a search to create new legal
rights. As the movement for privacy enforcement expands in search
of remedies, litigation destabilizes the current status quo that protects
privacy violators. At present, without clear statutory rights, there is
an important lack of legal accountability or liability for the unfair
treatment of personal information by the private sector. Scandals and
suits bring these practices to public attention and create higher
expectations along with instability for the status quo. This in turn
provides an incentive for legislative action to establish greater legal
certainty for the treatment of personal information. The mismatch of
enforcement mechanisms and creative efforts to find privacy
remedies just may be the missing catalyst for new legal rights to
privacy in the United States.
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